“Gay couples are just lifelong friends, says Catholic leader
Homosexual couples who want to get married merely enjoy a “profound friendship,” the leader of the Roman Catholic Church in England and Wales has said.”
And what does a leader in the world’s largest, wealthiest and thoroughly lawyered pedophile cult know about friendship?
About as much as he knows about love.
“The Archbishop of Westminster, the Most Reverend Vincent Nichols, said he appreciates some same-sex couples want to be joined in wedlock but insisted the true nature of marriage is between a man and a woman.
Asked what he would say to a gay Catholic couple who approached him for marriage within the Church, the Archbishop said: “I would want to say to them that I understand their desires, that I understand their experience of love is vitally important in their lives, but I would want to say to them that they are called in my view, in the Church’s view, to a very profound friendship in life.”
Would you now? How deliciously condescending.
See what’s going on here?
See? It’s just friendship.
Pay no attention to their kids.
Proves nothing. After all, breeders can do it too.
Back to Miss Thing
“I would want them to be respected, but I would want them to have a vision in themselves that what they are called to is not marriage but a very profound and lifelong friendship.”
Like Cole and Linda Porter!
Yes, these soignee sophisticates were married to each another. But their actual relationship was described by Cole, thusly.
As for The Politics of Friendship, well that means Jacques Derrida
Like Cole he is alas a ghost.
“Let me make just a single scholarly reference to Aristotle, who says that there are three types of friendship. Firstly, the higher friendship is based on virtue and it has nothing to do with politics. It is a friendship between two virtuous men. Secondly, the friendship grounded on utility and usefulness, and this is political friendship. Third, and on the lower level, friendship grounded on pleasure – looking for pleasure among young people, Aristotle says. So you see that we have a concept of friendship which is and is not political. The political friendship is one kind of friendship. One of the questions might be, to put it in a very everyday fashion, should we select our friends from among our political allies, should we politically agree with a friend to enter into friendship, is it necessary, are politics and friendship homogeneous? Could we have a friend who is politically an enemy and vice versa, and so forth? In Aristotle again you have this idea that the quest for justice has nothing to do with politics, you have to go beyond or sometimes betray friendship in the name of justice. So, there are a number of problems in which you see love – not love, but philia or friendship playing an organising role in the definition of the political experience.
Then what I try to do – I’m looking at my watch – is to follow the thread of the paradoxes between friendship and politics, to look for a prevailing canonical model of friendship which in our culture form the Greeks to now, in Greek culture, in Roman culture, in Jewish, Christian and Islamic culture, has been dominant, has been prevailing and hegemonic. What are the features of this prevailing hegemonic concept which could be politically meaningful and politically significant? I don’t want to homogenise of course – this concept is not a single homogeneous concept, it is not exactly the same in Greece, in the Middle Ages, and today, but there are some permanent features, and it is this set of permanent features that I try to discover, to analyse, to formalise from a political point of view.
So, what are they? To be very, very, very rough: first of all the model of this friendship is a friendship between two young men, mortals, who have a contract according to which one will survive the other, one will be the heir of the other, and they will agree politically – I give a number of examples of this. Which excludes first of all friendship between a man and a woman, or between women, so women are totally excluded from this model of friendship: woman as the friend of a man or women as friends between themselves. Then the figure of the brother, of fraternity, is also at the centre of this canonical model. I show this of course through a number of texts and examples. Brotherhood, fraternity, is the figure of this canonical friendship. Of course this concept of brotherhood has a number of cultural and historical premises. It comes from Greece, but it also comes from the Christian model in which brotherhood or fraternity is essential. Men are all brothers because they are sons of God, and you can find the ethics of this concept in even an apparently secular concept of friendship and politics. In the French Revolution this is the foundation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Fraternity was the object of a terrible debate in France at the time, and fraternity appears, between equality and liberty, as one of the foundations of the republic. So, you have to deal here with what I would call a phallocentric or phallogocentric concept of friendship. Which doesn’t of course mean to me that the hegemony of this concept was so powerful that what it excluded was effectively totally excluded. It doesn’t mean that a woman couldn’t have the experience of friendship with a man or with another woman. It means simply that within this culture, this society, by which this prevalent canon was considered legitimate, accredited, then there was no voice, no discourse, no possibility of acknowledging these excluded possibilities.”
“Phallogocentric” you say?
Well Cole knew quite a lot about that Jackie.
Isn’t that right Irene?